In this essay we will discuss about the state legislature of India. After reading this essay you will learn about: 1. Introduction to the State Legislature of India 2. Qualifications for Membership of the Legislative Council 3. Functions of the Legislative Council 4. Case for and against Vidhan Parishads 5. Vidhan Sabha 6. Powers of the Legislative Assembly 7. Speaker of the Assembly 8. Autonomy of State Legislatures in India.
List of Essays on the State Legislature of India
Essay Contents:
- Essay on the Introduction to State Legislature of India
- Essay on the Qualifications for Membership of Legislative Council
- Essay on the Functions of Legislative Council
- Essay on the Case for and against Vidhan Parishads
- Essay on the Vidhan Sabha
- Essay on the Powers of Legislative Assembly
- Essay on the Speaker of Assembly
- Essay on the Autonomy of State Legislatures in India
1. Essay on the Introduction to State Legislature of India:
Indian federation consists of a powerful centre and comparatively weak states as well as Union Territories. Some of the states are small in size, whereas the others are quite big. In Indian federal system some states have unicameral legislature, while others have provided for bicameralism. There was a proposal in the Constituent Assembly that all states should have bicameral system.
This was opposed strongly by others who believed that bicameral system of legislature should be abolished altogether. As a via media, it was, therefore, suggested that only those states which specifically decide to have bicameralism should have Legislative Council and not all. All other states should have only unicameral legislature.
Article 168 of the constitution provided that the states of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, J & K, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, Karnataka and U.P. shall have two Houses of Legislature, whereas other states shall have one House i.e., only Legislative Assembly. Subsequently in May, 1985, Andhra Pradesh and in 1986 Tamil Nadu Legislative Councils were abolished, thus, leaving bicameral Legislative Councils only in five states.
In 1989, Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly again passed a resolution favouring the creation of Legislative Council in the state. It is provided that when there are two Houses of legislature, Upper House shall be known as Legislative Council and the lower one as Legislative Assembly.
According to Article 169 of the ‘ constitution the Parliament may by law provide for the abolition of Legislative Council of a state having such a Council.
It also provides for the creation of such a Council in a state having no such Council; if the Legislative Assembly of the state passes a resolution to that effect by a majority of the total membership of the Assembly and by a majority of not, less than two-thirds of the members of the Assembly present and voting. Thus, initiative for the creation as well as abolition of Legislative Council, for all practical purposes vests with the state concerned.
It is provided that total strength of Legislative Council of a state shall not exceed one-third of the total membership of the Assembly. This is, however, subject to the condition that minimum strength of a Legislative Council shall not be less than forty in any case.
The Legislative Council shall consist of the following:
(1) One-third members shall be elected by municipalities and local bodies of the state;
(2) One-third by the members of the Legislative Assembly from amongst the persons who are not the members of the Legislative Assembly;
(3) One-twelfth of the members shall be elected by registered teachers of secondary schools, with at least 3 years’ experience;
(4) One-twelfth of the members shall be elected by registered graduates with three years’ experience and residing in state;
(5) Remaining members shall be nominated by the Governor, from among the persons who have excelled in the state in the fields of art, literature, social sciences and co-operative movement, etc.
In the case of elections, the members shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation by means of single transferable vote system.
At present five states have bicameral system of legislature.
Composition of each Legislative Council is as under:
There were Legislative Councils in Punjab and West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu but these have been abolished. One important feature of this composition procedure is that in no state the Governor is to nominate more than twelve members.
This is the maximum number which the President can nominate in the Rajya Sabha. Here also all nominations to be made by the Governor are made on the advice of the Chief Minister of the State.
2. Essay on the Qualifications for Membership of Legislative Council:
Any Indian citizen who has attained 30 years of age and possesses such other qualifications which entitle him to become a member of the state legislature, can become member of Legislative Council. But no person can become member of two legislatures, including that of the Parliament, at one and the same time.
He cannot become member of two state Legislative Assemblies or Councils. He should not hold any office of profit in any state or Union Government and should not have been convicted by any court for electoral malpractices or other crimes, of gravious nature, which do not entitle him to become a member of an elected body.
Like the Rajya Sabha, in the states the Legislative Councils are permanent bodies and as such cannot be dissolved. Each member is elected/nominated for a fixed term of six years, one-third of them retiring after every two years.
A person shall not be qualified to become a member of Legislative Council:
a. If he holds any office of profit under the Union Government or under and State Government:
b. If he is of unsound mind;
c. If he is un discharged insolvent;
d. If he has given up Indian citizenship or owes allegiance to a foreign state;
e. If he has been otherwise disqualified under a law passed by the central or state government;
f. If he has been found guilty of corrupt practices in an election, being a candidate.
Whether or not a person has disqualified himself or herself, in the case of any doubt the matter shall be referred to the Governor, who will consult the Election Commission and decide the issue. The decision of the Governor in this regard shall be final.
Every decision in the Council shall be taken by a majority votes if no special procedure for taking a decision is otherwise provided. At least 1/10 of the total membership of the House should be present for transacting any business.
At its first meeting the members of the Council are required to elect their Presiding Officer, who shall be called Chairman. They also are required to elect one Deputy Chairman as well. It is the responsibility of these two dignitaries to preside over the meetings of the Council and to ensure that whole business is transacted smoothly and in accordance with the rules of procedure and Conduct of Business of the House.
3. Essay on the Functions of Legislative Council:
Legislative Council is Upper House of a state legislature and as such as compared with Legislative Assembly, it has much less powers. It is because of these less powers that there has been a demand in some quarters that this House should be abolished from all the states.
i. Legislative Powers:
A legislative measure can be both a financial as well as non-financial. In the constitution it is provided that a non- financial bill can originate in either House of state legislature. When Legislative Assembly has passed a bill it is sent to die Council for its approval. In case the Council also accepts the bill, then there is no problem, but problem arises only when the bill is either rejected by the House or is modified by it.
The Council can also decide not to return the bill sent to it and thus keep it with itself. In such a case the lower House will wait for a period of three months. In case the bill is not received back within this period it will be presumed that the Council has rejected it. The Assembly will then again take up the bill and in case that is again passed by it in its original or modified form, it will be sent to the Council again.
In case the bill is neither approved nor returned in an amended or rejected form, within a period of one month it will then be treated to have been passed. There is then no need to refer the bill to the Council again. There is also no provision for joint sitting of two Houses.
In other words in the case of non-money bill, the Council can delay a bill at the most for a period of 4 months and nothing beyond that. It is, however, not clear as to what will happen in case a bill is passed by the Council but rejected by the Assembly. The presumption can be that such a measure is not likely to see the light of the day, because Assembly is much more powerful, than the Council.
ii. Financial Power:
The Legislative Council has practically no powers in financial matters. No money bill can be introduced in this House. A bill when passed by die Assembly and sent to the Council for its approval must be returned to the originating House within a period of 14 days. In case that is not returned, it will be presumed that the Council has passed the same and will be sent to die Governor for his approval.
In case the Council makes certain amendments or suggestions, which are not acceptable to the Assembly and that passes the bill in its original form even then that need not be sent to the Council again and that is treated to have been passed by both the Houses and sent to the Governor for his approval.
iii. Executive powers:
In die executive field also the Council has very little powers. The members of die Council can only put questions on the Ministers about working of their departments and seek information from them but beyond that they have no control over them. Even an unanimous vote of no confidence against die Council of Ministers has no real meaning because the Ministry does not go out of power. It is not at all obliged to resign.
Weakness of the Vidhan Parishad (Legislative Council) can be imagined from this very fact that a vote of Assembly for the abolition of this House, can result in the abolition of Parishad altogether. As already pointed out quite a good number of Councils have been abolished in the State.
iv. Constituent Powers:
Of course no constitutional amendment bill can be introduced in the Legislative Council, but along with Assembly it considers those constitutional amendment bills which are proposed by the Centre and are sent to the States for approval. In that capacity it can accept or reject any bill. When it discusses constitutional Amendment bill, it exercises constituent powers.
In bicameral system of legislatures in die world, the House of Lords in England is considered to be die weakest chamber of legislature. But in some respects a Legislative Council is in no better position.
4. Essay on the Case for and against Vidhan Parishads:
Case against Parishads:
In view of inherent weaknesses of Vidhan Parishads some critics are of the view that these should be abolished. According to them in case Parishad agrees with what is passed by the Assembly then it is simply a superfluous House. In case it does not then it will be characterised as a mischievious House and wall be charged as citadel of reaction standing on the way of policies and programme of duly elected House.
Then another criticism levied against this House is that it is no check on the Assembly. A money bill can be delayed only for a period of 14 days, which is very insufficient period for the members to express their view point. Even in the case of non-money bills it can only delay a bill for a Period of 4 months and it die Assembly is bent upon passing a measure no efforts on the part of the Parishad can stand on its way.
Similarly the Council of Ministers also does not much fear from it because a vote of no-confidence passed against it does not have any effect on die Ministry. It will continue in office as usual.
It is also argued that the Parishads are usually not very progressive. These have no directly elected elements. Some of the members are nominated ones. Their composition is such that these are not supposed to know public sentiments. Thus, the House is characterised as reactionary and conservative.
Then against the Councils it is argued that in these Houses scholarly or literary or social workers are usually not nominated. Instead this chamber is used for providing berth to defeated politicians or those active party workers who somehow or other could not be accommodated in the Assembly or are dissidents in the party to avoid party frictions.
In other words die Upper Houses neither represent any caste, class or section of society but only vested interests. All elections or nominations are made on party basis and these chambers are only for increasing party interests and influences.
Then the usual argument is that since these chambers do not serve much useful purpose, therefore, their maintenance is not worth die cost which the nation is required to bear for its upkeep and by way of salaries, allowances and other expenses of die members. In case Parishads are abolished the tax payer will be much saved and die money thus saved can be used for other useful purposes, including economic development of the state.
Though the Council cannot stand on die passing of any legislative measure of the Assembly, it can delay such measures for some time. Such delays at times stand on the way of progressive measures of the Assembly.
The very fact that only five states have retained Vidlian Parishad proves that bicameralism is not a very popular institution in India in die states. Moreover, practical experience has shown that those states which have no Vidlian Parishads are in no way doing work less efficiently than the other states. In case the Parishads had been doing very useful work, then the other states must have gone for it.
Then it is not clear to whom the Parishads represent. In case it is said that in it the teachers and graduates are to be given representation, along with those who are engaged in the promotion of co-operative work, then why only these vocations and why not other very important vocations and occupations as well.
In case it is felt that in that those who have excelled in any walk of state life, should be given representation, then why nomination has been kept at only 1/6. It should have been kept much higher than this low percentage.
The purpose of creating an Upper House is that it should act as a revisory chamber. It is presumed that in this House there will be calm and serene atmosphere, where every problem will be discussed in a passionless atmosphere because the elders have held out 110 promises to the people at the time of their election.
But again this has not been to be so because in the Upper House also political considerations very much weigh with the members. Each member votes and discusses every issue more or less on party lines and it is said that an Upper House is just extension of the lower House, in so far as political parties are concerned.
There is also no calm atmosphere in these Houses. The elders quite often quarrel with each other and do not provide much needed calmness.
According to some thinkers Upper Houses are necessary because these give sufficient time to the people to express their views. According to them when a bill is travelling from the Assembly to the Parishad, the people come to know what is going to be passed. Intervening time can be utilised for expressing opinion by the public and in case there are strong reservations, the bill can be modified as well.
But again this is not correct because the time taken in passing each bill in one House and stages through which it passes are so many that the people have sufficient time to express themselves, through press and platform. On this ground also the Upper Houses have no utility.
Arguments in Favour of Parishad:
But there are equally strong arguments about die retention of Upper Houses. The supporters of these Houses have their own arguments to advance. They feel that these Houses must be retained in the national interest.
In favour of these Houses it is said that in India the lower Houses are constituted on the basis of universal adult franchise. There are no voting qualifications based on education and property. In the Lower Houses both the literate as well as illiterate vote on political considerations.
It is argued out that in case democracy is to be saved from the caprice or uneducated persons for that it is essential that there should be Upper Houses. The importance of the Councils has still more increased because voting age has been lowered from 21 to 18 years, thus, increasing the number of young and less mature voters.
Then another argument advanced is that in every state there are people who have excelled in certain walks of life. The nation must take advantage of their abilities and capabilities. But they have no interest in contesting elections. Their services can best be utilised only with die help of Vidhan Parishads.
It is also argued that the very fact that there is another House, creates a very sobering effect on the lower House, which does not feel tempted to pass a bill either in haste or under the influence of some momentary impulses. In case any half cooked measure comes up then at least Upper House points that out to the duly elected representatives of the people, leaving to diem to accept die suggestion or not.
In other words it points out gravity of problems and suggests solution but does not very much care whether suggestions have been accepted or not.
Then another utility of the House is that minority communities in every state can be given representation in this House. Such a representation is likely to keep them very much happy and satisfied. Similarly die services of experienced persons who do not wish to contest elections, can also be used in this House.
Then another argument advanced is that legislative work everywhere has very much increased. It is becoming well neigh impossible for any House to cope with ever increasing legislative work. In case there are two Houses, some non-money bills or less controversial matters can be introduced in the Upper House and in this way pressure of work in the Lower House is considerably reduced. This is always a welcome relief for die Lower House.
It is accepted that law making process has become time consuming and sufficient time is taken by each House before a bill becomes an Act. It is also accepted that during this time, die people get an opportunity to express their view point. But when die bill goes to die Upper House, the people are bit more clear as to what is going to be passed.
Moreover, this time interval is always a welcome because during this period die people can express themselves and if need be changes can even now can also be introduced.
It is also argued that Upper Houses do not stand in any way on the determination of duly elected representatives of the people. All that they do is that they point out certain drawbacks and shortcomings which should always be welcome. These Houses can serve very useful purpose in case all political parties return therein people of eminence who have long and varied experience of life and maintain a good position in society.
If they are the people with the strength of character and also capacity to render service to the society they can do a lot of good to the society. Only those should be nominated who enjoy high reputation for their qualities of head and heart and have a spotless past life career.
These Houses are likely to remain under criticism in case these are used for providing berth to defeated politicians so that they can become Chief Ministers or Ministers by becoming a member of either House of legislature. On their part the members should try to rise above party lines while discussing die issues, but should discuss every Bill on its merits and view it from collective rather than party interest view point.
5. Essay on the Vidhan Sabha:
Under the constitution each Indian state shall have a Legislative Assembly which shall consist of not less than 36 and not more than 500 members. The members are to be elected on die basis of universal adult franchise, without any consideration for caste, creed and religion.
It is provided that the constituencies will be carved out on territorial basis and each constituency will be a single member constituency. Strength of each state Assembly has been fixed taking into consideration its population.
There is, however, a provision for safe-guarding the interests of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and Anglo-Indian community. Some constituencies are reserved for scheduled caste and scheduled tribe communities and members belonging to these communities can only be elected from there. Every effort is made to see that in each constituency in the state should have almost equal number of voters.
There is a provision in the constitution that when Governor of a state feels that Anglo-Indian community in his state has not been given proper representation, he can nominate a fixed number of members belonging to that community in the state Assembly.
At present nomination of this community in the state Assembly is two each in Karnataka and West Bengal and one each in Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and UP.
Total strength of each Assembly at present is as follows:
The seats of each Assembly will remain unchanged till the results of census taken in 200() A.D. are published.
Qualifications for Membership:
Qualifications for membership of Legislative Assembly are more or less the same as those of the Lok Sabha. Every Indian citizen can become a member of Legislative Assembly provided he has attained 25 years of age and does not hold any office of profit either in the Union or state government. He cannot be simultaneously a member of two Houses of legislature -either in his own state or in any other state or even that of Parliament.
Every Indian citizen who has attained 18 years of age is entitled to cast his vote in the election.
Each member of the Assembly is elected for a period of 5 years. This period was extended to 6 years with die passing of Forty-Second Constitution Amendment Act, but under Janata rule it was again brought down to 5 years. At present normal life of the Assembly is 5 years, which of course can be extended when there is some emergency in the country. But such an extension should not be more than one year at a time.
It is also provided that elections to the Assembly must be held within a period of 6 months after the proclamation of emergency has been withdrawn. But it is provided under Article 356 of the Constitution that the Governor can dissolve Legislative Assembly earlier as well, if in his opinion it is not possible to have stable government in the state with the present composition of the Assembly.
Such a situation arises:
(a) When no single political party has been returned to power at the time of elections with absolute majority to form government and other parties are not willing to co-operate with single largest party;
(b) When combination of parties does not provide stable government;
(c ) When the government is so much involved in its internal feuds that there is delay in taking decisions at political level or when the interests of the people are very adversely suffering;
(d) When those in political power have failed to provide clean administration to the people;
(e) When the government has failed to preserve law and order in the state;
(f) When the state government has failed to comply with the instructions given by die Centre;
(g) When it is clear that the government is not caring for die interests of the minority communities, both religious or others.
Thus, the Governor can dissolve state Assembly before it completes its normal term of 5 years. As mentioned elsewhere in India since independence almost every state Assembly has been dissolved. The decision of the Governor about dissolution of state Assembly is final, though it goes in the form of recommendations to die President. The Assembly has, therefore, uncertain term of office.
Under the constitution it is provided that the Assembly must sit at least twice in a year and also that interval between two sessions of Assembly must not be more than 6 months. It is also provided that quorum for die transaction of business in the Assembly is 1/10 of total membership of the House or 10 whichever is more.
The Presiding Officer:
At its very first session Assembly elects one of its members as Speaker and another one as Deputy Speaker. The Speaker presides over the meetings of die House and in his absence die meetings are presided over by the Deputy Speaker. The Speaker and Deputy Speaker perform same functions, have same rights and duties as are performed by their counter parts in the Lok Sabha.
In addition, there is also a panel of Chairman when both the Speaker and Deputy Speaker are not available for presiding over die meetings of the House, one from the panel takes the Chair.
The Speaker and Deputy Speaker is to be paid such salary and allowances as the Assembly may decide from time to time. The Speaker can be removed from his office by a majority resolution of die Assembly, but for moving such a resolution 14 days notice is required. The Speaker is to be given die fullest opportunity to explain his position.
Each Member of die legislature is required to take an oath affirmation confirming his allegiance to the constitution of India.
6. Essay on the Powers of Legislative Assembly:
In a state, where even there is Legislative Council real power and authority vests in the Assembly. Of course, in such cases wherever there is no Upper House, Assembly is the supreme power and authority. It has exclusive powers both in executive, legislative and financial matters.
In the legislative field both money as well as non-money bills in respect of subjects mentioned in the State list can originate in this House. The Upper House, as already pointed out, can delay a legislative measure, but in no way it can stand on the will of the Assembly.
The Assembly also has a right to legislate on subjects mentioned in the concurrent list, subject of course to the condition that such a legislative measure should not be against any legislative measure passed by the Parliament. No tax can be levied, amended or reduced in the state without the approval of the Assembly. The Parishad can only delay a money bill, for a period of 14 days.
The Assembly has full control over the state executive. The Council of Ministers can remain in power only so long as it enjoys the confidence of the Assembly. It is accountable to the Assembly for all acts of omission and commission.
It is to satisfy the House about execution and performance of all policies and programmes already approved by the House. In case Assembly passes a vote of no-confidence against the Council of Ministers, that means all of government.
The Assembly also has constituent powers. Under Article 368 of the constitution, it is provided that in certain cases for amendment of the constitution it is essential that consent of the states should be obtained e.g., those amendments which affect federal structure of the Union; method of election of President of India; executive powers of Union and the State, matters relating to High Courts and Supreme Court; distribution of legislative powers between the Union and States; representation of States in Parliament and amendment of constitution, etc.
When a proposal about constitutional amendment is placed before the Assembly for its approval and whether it approves or disapproves that, it acts as Constituent Assembly. In this way it discharges such functions which are performed by the Constituent Assembly.
Then Assembly function is also about the changes in the boundaries of the state. The Parliament under the constitution can re-arrange boundaries of a state, thereby increasing or decreasing its existing areas. Before any legislative measure is introduced in the Parliament views and consent of the states concerned is obtained and the Assembly takes a decision in this regard as well.
The Assembly has electoral functions to perform as well. For the election of the President of India an electoral college is formed. Such a college consists of elected members of legislature of each state. Since Legislative Assembly is composed of elected members, therefore, it is, an important participant in the whole process.
Similarly Assembly also elects its own Speaker and Deputy Speaker and removes them, if need be, by passing a vote of no-confidence against either one or both.
From time to time state governments set up commissions and committees. There are also several autonomous and independent bodies which function in a state. Reports of these bodies and commissions are placed before the Assembly for its consideration and approval.
The Assembly takes this opportunity to comment on the working of these organisations and bodies and suggests ways and means of improving these as well.
7. Essay on the Speaker of Assembly:
Speaker of the Assembly is its presiding officer. He is elected by the members of the Assembly at its first meeting. He must belong to the House but as soon as he is elevated to that high office, he is supposed to become impartial and look-after the interests of all the sections of the House. He is expected to perform all those functions and enjoys all those privileges, which are enjoyed by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha.
i. West Bengal Case:
In November, 1967, Governor of the state Dharam Vira dismissed United Front Government headed by Ajoy Kumar Mukerjee on the plea that the Chief Minister had lost the confidence of the House. His calculation was based on the presumption that the Chief Minister was not prepared to convene session of the Assembly on the date on which Governor desired him to call.
He then invited Dr. P.C. Ghosh to form Government and on his advice he convened Assembly meeting on November 29, 1967. As soon as the Assembly met Speaker Bijoy Kumar Banerjee adjourned the House sine die saying that prime facie dismissal of Ajoy Kumar Mukerjee Government was invalid and it was equally unconstitutional to invite Dr. Ghosh to form government and to call Assembly session on his advice.
The decision of the Governor about dismissal of United Front Government headed by Mukerjee was challenged in Calcutta High Court, which held that the action of the Governor in calling Dr. Ghosh to form Government was quite justified because he was to satisfy himself, as to who could give stable government to the state.
After obtaining the decisions of the High Court Assembly session was again called in February, 1968. But this time Speaker again adjourned the House sine die saying that the courts had nothing to do in such matters. There was thus no other alternative but to advice the President to dissolve the Assembly.
But this action of the Speaker evoked a lot of controversy all over the country. After being elevated to the high office of Speaker, the occupant of the chair is supposed to be above party politics. He is not supposed to decide whether dismissal of a particular Ministry is justified or not. Under the constitution the Council of Ministers holds office during the pleasure of the Governor.
The Governor had appointed Dr. Ghosh as the Chief Minister and in case he was wrong in his choice, the Chief Minister would have been defeated on the floor of the House. In case the new Chief Minister enjoyed confidence of the House, then dismissal of old government was justified and the Speaker should have no grudge.
In case the dismissal was unwanted, Dr. Ghosh would have been defeated on the floor of the House and Speaker would have amused himself at the happening.
Then there is another aspect. It is constitutional duty of the Speaker to see that each member of the Assembly individually and the Assembly collectively gets an opportunity to express itself. But by his action the Speaker did the reverse.
By his ruling and by adjourning the House he did not provide the Assembly an opportunity to express itself and this created a situation of suffocation in which the members wanted to express themselves but had no opportunity to do so.
Another important issue arises is whether Speaker is the authority to decide whether the Ministry should or should not hold office. Does it in other words mean that the Council of Ministers is not only to satisfy the Governor about its continued support of the Assembly but also to the Speaker of the House as well.
This was never the intention of constitution makers and there is equally no provision in any Article of the constitution about this.
Then the action of West Bengal Speaker was not hailed in many quarters. It was characterised, as partisan. In the words of G.N. Singh, “In this connection, the action of the West Bengal Assembly Speaker is not only unconstitutional but also derogatory to the dignity of the Assembly, the electorate and the Governor. It created a deadlock and made the functioning of Assembly impossible.”
In this way the Speaker arrogated to himself all those functions about assessing continued support of the Assembly to the government, which should have performed by the House itself.
Even one of the Speakers of the Lok Sabha N. Sanjiva Reddy in the course of his address to the Presiding Officers of State Legislatures made it very clear that the Speakers should not get involved in the struggle for power by contending political parties. He also said that no Speaker should arrogate to himself powers which legitimately belongs to the House.
He felt that by adjourning the House sine die, the Speaker rendered the very House which could take a decision in the matter ineffective. He hoped that the Speakers would evolve a suitable code of conduct for themselves and impose a self-denying ordinance with a view to prevent themselves from action in an arbitrary manner and subverting parliamentary democracy in the country.
Another ex-Speaker G. S. Dhillon also said that, “I do not think that presiding officers should ever meddle with the affairs of the state whether at the centre or in the states.”
ii. Punjab Case:
Like West Bengal, Speaker in Punjab also created a history in 1968. In 1968, Mr. Joginder Singh was Speaker of the Assembly and S. Lachhman Singh was the Chief Minister of the state. In March 1968, Speaker adjourned the House for a period of 2 months and held that the new Council of Ministers was not a duly constituted body.
At the time when the Assembly was adjourned, it was in budget session and there was great urgency that financial measures and budget should be passed in time.
In order to save the state from financial crisis Governor prorogued the Assembly and issued an ordinance that legislature shall not be adjourned without the consent of the House unless financial business had been concluded. Governor summoned the Assembly to meet on March 14, 1968.
When the Assembly met again Speaker ruled that summoning of Assembly by the Governor in this manner was wrong and ordinance promulgated by him was unconstitutional. After giving his rulings the Speaker left the House.
But the Assembly continued to sit and Deputy Speaker presided. Within a short period of 5 minutes financial bills were approved and certified by him, sent to the Upper House and after having been approved were assented by the Governor. On this, matter was challenged in the High Court. The court was of the view that the House was legally summoned by the Governor and that there was nothing wrong in that.
But it ruled that financial business transacted by the House was unconstitutional. But when the appeal was made in the Supreme Court, against the decision of the High Court, the former court held that the Speaker had no authority to adjourn the House for a period of two months, especially at a time when budget was to be passed and time was running short.
All this was perhaps done because Speaker did not wish that the Assembly should discuss a motion of no-confidence pending against him.
But his action was very much criticised and in this it was also ruled that the Speaker had arrogated to himself powers which were those enjoyed by the Assembly. It was also said that the Speaker should use his discretionary power of adjourning the House very carefully. He should always remember that he is not the master of the House.
It is ultimately for the House to decide for how long it wants to sit and what type of business it wants to transact. The Speaker is to see that business of the House is being transacted in accordance with the rules of procedure and conduct of business. Instead of creating obstructions, it is the duty of the Speaker to see that House continues to function smoothly and all those obstructions which are created on its way are removed.
Like Bengal case, this case was also much criticised and impression left behind was that it was a politically motivated ruling and the object was that the House should not discuss motion of no-confidence pending against the Speaker.
iii. Madras Case:
Like above mentioned two cases Speaker of the Madras Legislative Assembly created a history in 1971. It was time when a split came in ruling DMK party and All India ADMK, a new political party was founded by M.G. Ramachandran. Speaker Mathialagam had sympathies with the break away group and DMK group moved a vote of no-confidence against him, for which a proper notice was also given.
In order to save his position Speaker adjourned the House sine die. But Governor, on the advice of the Chief Minister, summoned the House. Meanwhile break away group moved a vote of no-confidence against the government. When the House met the government wanted that the Speaker should leave the chair because a vote of no-confidence was pending against him.
But leader of the opposition wanted that first a vote of no-confidence moved by him against the government should be considered.
The Speaker admitted a motion of vote of no-confidence against the government. Leader of the House, however, moved that since a motion against the Speaker was pending he had no right to admit a motion against the government but should vacate the chair. At this stage Deputy Speaker moved towards the chair and started transacting business of the House.
Since the government was in majority the Speaker along with the members of the opposition left the House. As there was no opposition, therefore, motion against the Speaker was carried out.
Decision of the Assembly was challenged by the opposition in Madras High Court in which it was alleged by the Speaker that Deputy Speaker and the government was interfering in his affairs and that they may be restrained from doing so. Action of the Governor in summoning the House was also challenged.
The court, however, did not agree with the petitioners. In its view the Governor was justified in his action but the Speaker had wrongly adjourned the House. It also held that it had no jurisdictions in going through the proceedings of the House, but was of the view that the Speaker should not have admitted vote of no confidence against the government when a similar vote was pending against him.
iv. Jammu & Kashmir Case:
In 1980, relations between the then Speaker Malik Mohiuddin and leader of the House Shiekh Addulla got strained. On the initiative of the Chief Minister a vote of no-confidence was passed against the Speaker and approved by the Governor. The latter also fixed a date for convening the meeting of the Assembly for electing a new Speaker.
Meantime the ousted Speaker challenged decision of the Assembly about his removal, in the Supreme Court. His plea was that everything was done in undue haste.
The court directed the Chief Minister to convene a session of the Assembly and get earlier decision about removal of Speaker re-affirmed. The Assembly was again summoned in session and decision re-affirmed. In this way crisis were averted.
Though there have as yet been very few incidents of this type in India, yet the chances of mischief are there. It can be played at any time any where and as such it is desirable that the matter should be examined carefully and a code of conduct for the Presiding Officers should be developed, so that they can use their discretionary powers in a manner that their impartiality is not doubted.
8. Essay on the Autonomy of State Legislatures in India:
In Indian federal polity the centre is very powerful and strong, whereas the states are comparatively weak. But in spite of all this the states enjoy certain autonomy and in that way these are not glorified municipalities. These can enact on the subjects mentioned in the state list and normally the centre is not supposed to interfere in the working of the states. But state autonomy is limited in several ways.
In India there is independence of judiciary. It has been given power to declare a law passed by the state legislature as ultra vires or unconstitutional. Thus, every state law must have indirect approval of judiciary. It is first important check on the autonomy of legislature.
Another check on the autonomy of state legislature is that it cannot touch subjects mentioned in the central list and also subjects which are not mentioned in three lists i.e., residuary subjects, because these come within the purview of the central government.
Of course a state legislature can enact a law on a subject mentioned in the concurrent list, but under the constitution in case a state law is in conflict with a law passed by the Parliament on a subject mentioned in the concurrent list, it is central law which shall prevail and to that extent to which it is violative of central law will be ultra vires or unconstitutional.
Then laws on the subject like compulsory acquisition of private property can be reserved by the Governor, for the approval of the President, even though unanimously passed by the state legislature. The President has every right to disapprove such a measure. In this connection it may be pointed out that state legislature cannot pass a measure again which has once been vetoed by the President.
Such bills which effect inter state trade and commerce relations even cannot be introduced in the state Assembly without the approval of the President.
Another restriction on the autonomy of state legislature is the Rajya Sabha. If Upper House of Parliament by two-thirds majority of the members present and voting passes a resolution to the effect that in the national interest Parliament should enact 011 a subject mentioned in the state list, the Parliament shall be quite competent to deal with such a subject.
The President is empowered to declare state of emergency in the country without consulting the states. But once such an emergency has been declared, the Parliament takes powers to legislate on the subjects mentioned in the state list. Not only this, but such laws continue to remain in operation for a period of six months, even after the Proclamation has been withdrawn.
On the recommendations of Chief Minister or in his own discretion, the state Governor can recommend the President that constitutional machinery in the state has broken down and it is not possible to run state administration in accordance with the provisions of the constitution. In such a situation Parliament enacts laws for the state and state budget is presented and approved by the Parliament.
The State legislature cannot over-ride the Veto of the President.
Autonomy of state of Assam is restricted to the extent that it cannot enact any measure about frontier areas about which Governor is to act in his discretion and receive instructions, if any, from the President.
Still another limitation is that the state governments cannot raise loan without the consent of the central government. Similarly these cannot raise any loan from outside India, either from any foreign government or foreign agency; without the approval of Central Government.
In this way the state legislatures have serious limitations. Their sphere of activity is already very limited and with the imposition of several constitutional and other restrictions it has been still more been restricted. In some of the states, political leadership has demanded that the states should be given more powers but on the whole atmosphere in the country is such that majority feels that Centre should by strong.
As long as this tendency and atmosphere prevails the states are bound to have limited powers and with that their legislative activities shall remain restricted.
Sarkaria Commission Recommendations:
Opposition ruled states have been demanding rather forcefully that the States should be given more powers and resources. Accordingly the Government of India set up Sarkaria Commission to examine the demands of the States and recommend how far these are justified, keeping in view present conditions of the country and its financial resources.
The Commission invited representations from the States, Central government and all those who were interested in giving their views. It also circulated a detailed questionnaire to all concerned. On the basis of representations received and interviews held the Commission sent its final report to the Central Government.
The Commission was in favour of giving some more autonomy for the states. But general atmosphere in the country being as it was the Central Government should continue to enjoy more powers, which it is now enjoying. It should be strong enough to maintain unity and give political stability to the country.
The need is still more felt because in the state by and large regional political parties have failed to give political stability on the one hand and efficient and clean administration on the other. In the state legislatures even there are fist-fighting and ugly happenings to the disliking of all.
United Front Government which came to power at the Centre in June, 1996 in its common programme has stated that it will, in consultation with its constituents implement those recommendations of Sarkaria Commission; which are agreed by all. It will also set up a committee to examine the recommendations of the commission.